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GRUTTER OR OTHERWISE: RACIAL
PREFERENCES AND HIGHER EDUCATION
Larry Alexander*
Maimon Schwarzschild**
The Supreme Court decisions on affirmative action have arrived.1 They are dubious as constitutional law, bringing to mind
what John Hart Ely said of Roe v. Wade: "it is not constitutional
law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be. " 2 Yet
because the cases were about whether affirmative action is permissible, not whether it is required, the salient question- now
more than ever-is whether preferential affirmative action is a
good thing. At least in higher education, we will suggest, there is
overwhelming reason to think it is not.
The outcome of the Supreme Court cases should perhaps
have been no surprise. The set-up was perfect for Justice
O'Connor, who has made something of a career of being the
Court's swing voter, and who has a penchant for opinions that
split unsplittable babies. 3 The University of Michigan's two racial preference admissions schemes- the undergraduate school's
crude "20 points if you're a minority,d and the law school's allegedly holistic "how does each person contribute to an educa-
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Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego.
Professor of Law, University of San Diego.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 53\1 U.S. 244 (2003); Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 53\1 U.S. 306

John Hart Ely, The IVages of Crying \Vo/f A Commem on Roc v. Wade, /l2
L.J. \120,\147 (1\173).
3. See, e.g., Mitchdl v. Hdms, 530 U.S. 7\13, /l36 (20m) (O'Connor, J, concurring
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in an '"establishment clause" case involving public aid to private-including parochialschools, hut refusing either to endorse the "neutrality" test favored by the plurality or the
"no aid to any religious mission" principle of the dissent); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1 \1\12) (O'Connor, J, joining two other Justices in
striking down "undue burdens" on abortion fur reasons of s/llre decisis while repudiating
the "trimester scheme" and other key clements of Roc v. Wade); Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267,284 (1\186) (O'Connor, J., cnncurring in striking down
a minority preference in teacher layoffs. but refusing either to juin the plurality's rejection of racial preferences or the dissenters' endorsement of them).
4. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244.
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tionally-enriching diverse student body?" 5 -were perfect for
O'Connor's rejection of transparent racial goals and endorsement of disingenuous ones. 6 As is fairly widely recognized, the
law school's scheme is dishonest because it is not what it is billed
to be, namely, a holistic, individual assessment of applicants,
conducted with an eye to the quality of the educational environment: rather, it is like the undergraduate system, a plan that
is about meeting goals for racial representation. Educational
benefits are doubtful and, in fact, largely window dressing driven
by language in Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke 7 • As for the
"holistic" individual assessments, they always seem to produce
something very close to a particular percentage of particular minorities. Nor is there ever any question of ensuring "critical
masses" of, say, farm children, Appalachians, evangelical Christians, or ex-businessmen/businesswomen, all of whom might contribute to legal education as much as or more than people identified by their race. Justice O'Connor presumably knows all this,
although she pretended not to.
The finding that Michigan's interest in maintaining an elite
law school is a compelling interest sufficient to justify a racial
classification is utterly inconsistent with the Court's suspectclassification/compelling-interest jurisprudence now extending
back over many decades. Are the "means" -racial preferencesreally "necessary" to ensure that the law school will be of elite
quality? In California there are several public law schools, generally conceded to be among the most elite in the country, which
are forbidden by the state constitution to indulge in racial preferences. As for "diversity" as a "compelling interest," imagine a
state government's plan to "diversify" some heavily minority
branch of state government by giving preferences to whites.
8
Does anyone believe Justice O'Connor would uphold those?

5. Gruuer, 53LJ U.S. at 306.
6. Justice O'Connor joined in Chid Justice R..:hnquist's majority opinion in Grmz
holding unconstitutional the undergraduate school's 20 point preference fur minorities,
and she authored the majority opinion in Gruuer upholding the law school's ''holistic,"
race-as-a-factor admission scheme.
7. Regents uf the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1LJ78).
8. Suppose that racial preferences were necessary for ensuring that the University
of Michigan's law school remained "elite." Is maintaining an elite law school a compdling governmental interest, as strict scrutiny demands' 1 Would it justify, say, the internment of Japanese-Americans, as in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1LJ44), if
somehow racial internments were necessary for producing elite law schools? Or perhaps
more realistically, would it justify forcibly conscripting, say, Jews or Asians, if members
of these groups failed to apply to Michigan's law school in sufficient numbers to maintain
its elit<.: status 'I or course not. Q.E.D.
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The compelling interest test for racial classifications is dead- at
least in this case.
What Justice O'Connor's opinion amounts to is that if universities can disguise their admissions systems so that it is not
too blindingly obvious that they are pursuing racial representation for its own sake, they can get away with it, although they are
admonished that using race as a criterion is a dirty business and
that they should try their hardest to eliminate it by, say, 2028. If
''strict scrutiny" of racial classifications has to be diluted or denatured in order to uphold the plan, then so be it, although the
Court will claim not to be doing so. And after all, perhaps diversity is a compelling interest. Look at all the amicus briefs from
corporate America saying that it is. 9
Whether or not the Supreme Court should have held racial
preferences by the government to be unconstitutional, what
seems clear to us is that the culture of racial preferences in
higher education has proved very bad as a matter of policy. And
the policy question is now what counts, because the Grutter decision does not require colleges and universities to engage in racial
preference in admissions (much less in faculty hiring or promotion): the decision merely permits admissions preferences. So the
question is thrown back to the universities, or to the state legislatures, to decide as a matter of policy.
For better or worse, racial preferences in higher education
have been a fact of life for several decades in the United States.
More is therefore known from experience, or ought to be, than
could have been known when preference policies were intro-

9. Why do corporations file brids in support of racial prd!.!n:nc!.!s'l First, it sounds
good, at kast in thus!.! in!lu!.!ntial circks wiKrl! "a!!irmativl! action" is a mattl!r of politico-moral sdf-congratulatlon if not an article of faith. These briefs arc like the tckvision
commncials that would have you b!.!licvc the oil company cares about th<: environment.
When corporations cndors.: racial preferences to produce "diversity," thl!y arc similarly
trying to sound progressive so that people will s.:.: them in a warmn, softer light and buy
their products.
Second, howevn, managers of a corporation might endorse allirmativc action (or
any oth<:r political cause) cv.:n if ll is not good for the corporation, to advance their pnsonal views or agl!ndas: an exampk of "agency costs."
Third, corporations fear pr<:ssure from "activists." If a corporation is threatened, explicitly or implicitly, with boycott (or worse), the corporation may conclude that it costs
less to submit rathn than to incur the boycott.
Finally, large corporations may obtain a competitive ccunomic advantage if legal
rules impose expensive or counterproductive programs equally on them and on their
smaller, poorn compl!litors, who can less afford to comply.
What all this suggests to us is that the endorsement of racial affirmative action by
corporate America should carry littk or no weight.
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duced-perhaps with the best of intentions-years or decades
ago.

1.

Racial preferences at public universities require government
officials to classify people by race; but racial (and ethnic)
classifications are unscientific, arbitrary, and often nearly
meaningless.

Human beings are not divided biologically into three, or
five, or any number of "races." Human beings are one interbreeding species. Each individual is genetically unique. No matter into which racial box one is arbitrarily put, one can have children with someone from another box, and the children must
then be arbitrarily assigned to some box. In the nineteenth century, people spoke about the "French race" and the "German
race." That might seem silly today, but it is no sillier than speaking of the "white race," or bracketing (or separating) Somalis
and Zulus, or Melanesians and Polynesians, or Mongols and Malays. If an ex-slave from Jamaica married the daughter of an
English planter, and their son married the daughter of a Trinidadian Indian and a Chinese merchant, what box would the
University of Michigan have their daughter check, and why? If
that question cannot be nonarbitrarily answered-and it cannot-it is not because the example is farfetched. It is not. Everyone fits this example. Everyone is genetically unique, and all of
us are members of one interbreeding species. Any division into
"races" is arbitrary; 10 and, when done by government, it tends to
be obnoxious.
And if race is arbitrary, so too is "ethnicity." Who, for example, is a Hispanic? A poor Indian from Oaxaca? A writer of
German ancestry from Santiago? An emigrant from Barcelona?
A Jewish academic from Buenos Aires?
In everyday life, to be sure, when we refer to someone's
race or ethnicity, we need not be speaking scientifically, and it
may do no harm to be arbitrary. People classify themselves and
each other in all sorts of ways. Sometimes these classifications
hurt, but sometimes they are not of much consequence. In any
event, there are as many classifications as there are classifiers,
and classifications morph and change over time. But when the

10. There is hroad scholarly support for this proposition. See, e.g., NAOMI ZACK,
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND RACE 58-62 (2002); JOSEPH L. GRAVES, JR., THE
EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RACE AT THE MILLENICM
(2()()1); Joshua M. Glasgow, On the New Biology of Race, 100 J. PHIL. 456 (2003).
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government classifies people racially and ethnically, and then
makes valuable entitlements such as admission to a university
turn on those classifications, matters are different. Because race
and ethnicity are scientifically baseless and arbitrary, government will necessarily classify-and bestow favor and disfavorarbitrarily. The precedents for such classification are not encouraging: the Jim Crow South, apartheid South Africa, Balkan
states at various points during the twentieth century, and- with
lots of pseudo-science to back it up-Nazi Germany. Not regimes most Americans would wish to take as models.
2.

Racial classifications by government lead to racialism, and
racialism leads to division and often to racism.

When government classifies by race in order to award preferences, that very fact encourages people to think that "races"
are real categories, not bogus ones, and that one's race is an exceedingly important rather than a superficial fact about oneself
and others. In other words, it encourages people to pay close attention to race and to think in racial terms. That is what is meant
by "racialism."
Racialism in itself might seem relatively harmless. After all,
racialism- thinking that race is real and important- is not the
same thing as racism, which is thinking that some people deserve
less concern and respect than others solely because of their race.
Yet racialism has a built-in tendency to promote racism.
For one thing, racialism's message is that the races are different from one another. If races were the same, there would be
no point in distinguishing them. But if the races are different,
then however much we might like to "celebrate difference," we
are apt in fact to have racial antagonism. If what is important
about me-what you "celebrate"-is not my common humanity
with you, but my difference from you (because of my race or
ethnicity), I shall see myself as different, and I shall be disposed
to nurture and accentuate my differences. This is quite common
on campuses: students admitted because of their "difference"
tend to magnify their difference and often segregate themselves
from others. Once differences are magnified, antagonisms tend
to magnify as well. This is all too common in human experience.
People would not have to be exhorted to "celebrate difference"
if they did so naturally and un-self-consciously.
Above all, so far as colleges and universities are concerned-
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Racial preferences in higher education are bad for
students and for the institutions themselves.

The overall costs of racial (and ethnic) preferences greatly
outweigh the occasional benefits.
There are surely individual success stories that are the results of racial preference: young people who, but for such preference, would not have attended an elite university, yet having
been admitted, go on to achieve success in school and beyond.
University admission processes are imperfect, and racial preferences sometimes correct what would have been an erroneous
decision. Of course, anecdotes about such successes do not take
into account the success stories that might have been told had
those excluded- because their race was not preferred- been
admitted instead.
The heavy educational and social costs are several:
(a) Diluting admissions standards.
The typical criteria for admission to selective colleges and
universities-GPA and SAT (and their postgraduate equivalents
such as the LSAT, MCAT, and GRE)-although imperfect as
measures of aptitude for higher education, are nonetheless
pretty good, especially when compared to proposed substitutes
like race, or thinly-veiled proxies for race, such as "life experience."11 In efforts to disprove the merits of GPA and SAT, some
defenders of preferences point to individual minority students
who do as well in college as some non-minority students, but
who were admitted with lower GPAs and/or SATs. But, of
course, these findings do not prove that the GPA/SAT is a poor
predictor, for minorities or for anyone else. A GPA/SAT index
predicts how the median student with that index will perform,
not how every student with that index will perform. Students in
the right-hand tail of the bell curve of people with a lower index
will overlap with people in the left-hand tail of the bell curve of
people with a higher index. If you compare only those people in
the area of overlap, you will draw the erroneous conclusion that
the indexes don't predict well. But that is to ignore the median
person with the index, not to mention those in the right tail of
II. See, e.g., Diane Ainsworth, Regems Approve Comprehensive Review Admissions
Process, BERKELEYAN ONLINE, 29 Nov. 2lXll, http://www.bcrkclcy.edu/ncws/lx:rkckyan/
2lXll/11129_compr.html. Cf Matt Cox, Preference Versus Preparation: UC Regents Rewm To
Race-Based AdmissiollS, Pacilic Research Institute Briding, Apr. 2lXJ2, available at http://www.
pacilicrcscarch.org/pub/sab/cduca!IPrcf_v_prep. pdf.
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the higher index bell curve and the left tail of the lower index
bell curve.
The fact is that those admitted to college or graduate school
through racial preferences are in general less qualified- not necessarily unqualified (whatever that means), but less qualified-to
do college and postgraduate work than those admitted without
preferences.
(b) Lowering of educational standards at schools that admit
by preferences.
If students admitted through racial preferences are less
qualified- and, in general, they are- this will have consequences
for the quality of education that they and others on campus will
receive. Predictably, having a body of racially and ethnicly identifiable students who are at a competitive disadvantage with the
other students leads to grade inflation to disguise the poor performance of a racially identifiable group. No one wants such a
readily visible group of students to fail or to do poorly. Likewise,
it leads to the creation of bogus departments and majors, similar
to-but generally more extensive than-the "athletes' courses"
and majors designed to keep athletes above water at universities
with admissions preferences for athletes. Virtually every university with serious racial preferences has one or more departments
that are safe houses for the less qualified racially preferred: departments that are frequently staffed by faculty who are themselves hired on the basis of racial preferences; departments that
substitute political polemics and esteem-raising for rigorous, disinterested scholarship. 12
One of the worst outgrowths of racial preferences is that
students admitted through such preferences are systematically
mismatched educationally. 13 A student who would have been an
A orB student majoring in a serious discipline at State University turns into a C or D student majoring in ethnic studies at
Elite University. A generation of minority students, who would
have done well, or certainly no worse than average, at colleges
where they would have been admitted on their merits, have instead been "cas. aded" upwards to colleges where their preparation and qualifications are significantly below average, and
where- entirely predictably- many do significantly less well
than average, and in subjects that are more polemical and less
12.
13.

See THO\tAS SOWELL. AFFIR\1ATIYE ACriO:\ AROL:\D THE WORLD 14H (2004 ).
See id. al 145-50.
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rigorous than average; and all too many fail. Upon emerging
from college, minority graduates-especially those from the
more prestigious schools-are liable to be stigmatized as affirmative action graduates, their capabilities and their skills mistrusted. Perhaps the most poisonous aspect of this is the lingering self-consciousness it provokes: "Do my colleagues on the job
secretly look at my ethnicity or the color of my skin and assume
that I am not up to the job?"
Meantime, on campus, the presence of less qualified and racially-identifiable students and faculty, coupled with the official
line that "difference" is celebrated, inevitably encourages a more
general erosion of real academic standards. No one wants to believe that he or she is less qualified than his or her peers,
whether one is a student or a professor. Perhaps one is just "differently qualified." Indeed, perhaps the prevailing academic
standards, those by which relative quality is gauged, are themselves just figments of European, or male, or capitalist values, no
more (and perhaps less) valid than other standards. Perhaps
there are just "different" standards for good literature, math,
history, economics, and science, and no standard is superior to
the others.
This heady blend of identity politics and postmodern nihilism has already had destructive effects on many disciplines on
many campuses. Much of this is a direct outgrowth of racial and
other identity preferences in admissions and in faculty hiring and
promotion.
(c) Racial balkanization and segregation.
The combination of emphasizing racial differences and attacking standards for admissions and hiring tends to balkanize
campuses. If races are different, and if standards are i1legitimate,
why not accentuate the differences through racially separate
dorms, organizations, and cliques, as well as academic departments, and why not at the same time demand the admission of
still more students and the hiring of more faculty based on race?
After all, the differences are real and important. And no legitimate standards are compromised by expanded racial admissions
and hiring. Preferential admission based on race, far from satisfying anyone, leads to escalating racial demands and racial separation, and-perversely or otherwise-to an increasing sense of
grievance among many "beneficiaries" of preferences.
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Sadly, the racial segregation one finds on campuses today is
not solely attributable to beliefs in "difference." It is also attributable to a fear that the once-conventional academic standards,
far from being illegitimate, are in fact valid measures of academic wherewithal. Better to congregate with others admitted
preferentially, whether in choosing an academic major or in
choosing with whom to eat at the lunch table, rather than to mix
freely with those whose stronger qualifications might expose one
to humiliation.
(d) Pervasive dishonesty.

The currency of academic life is, or ought to be, candor.
When intellectual honesty vanishes from research, publication,
and teaching, the purpose of the academy is compromised or
lost. 14 Yet preferential admissions and hiring lead directly to
"political correctness" and its assault on academic candor. There
is a constant fear that frank discussion of racial preferences and
the standards they compromise will wound the pride of those racially preferred. Enter an array of campus speech codes and
conventions-the informal ones are far more pervasive than the
formal ones-as protection against any possible outbreak of
candor.
4.

Universities are not interested in race for reasons of
educational "diversity."

We can be brief about this. In recent years, universities have
sought to justify racial preferences by the alleged contribution of
racial diversity to the education of those admitted under the
normal standards. Those arguments are insincere: the universities are interested in race, not diversity of views or backgrounds.
No universities give preferences in admission or in faculty hiring
to evangelical Christians, to children of military families, or to
many groups that are quite underrepresented in student bodies
and particularly on faculties. (How many faculties have sought
out a "critical mass" of conservative Republicans to ensure diversity?) Much of the rhetoric about "diversity" stems from the
fact that the idea appeared in the-lone-opinion of Justice
Lewis Powell in the Supreme Court's Bakke decision in 1978,
and was seized upon, more or less opportunistically, by those
who were already convinced that the cause of civil rights (or
14.

See id. at 190-93.
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their particular conception of it) calls for racial and ethnic preferences.

5. What Is to Be Done About Racial Disparities in
Qualifications for Selective Universities?
Whenever any child fails to achieve his or her full educational potential, that is a loss no matter what the child's race. For
minority children the loss may be particularly sharp, insofar as
minority families may have fewer non-educational resources, on
average, with which to help their children establish themselves in
life. No doubt many minority children fail to reach their education potential, and this is reflected in the disproportionately
small percentage of blacks, in particular, who can gain admission
to selective universities without the aid of racial preferences.
And there are no doubt many white and Asian students who fail
to realize their potential, even if the percentage is not as high as
that of blacks. But every case of such failure is a personal and
community loss, no matter the race of the child.
Why are some minorities proportionately less qualified to
attend selective universities? Poverty and poor schools are
among the obvious suspects, although cultural attitudes matter
as well. Distressingly, the black-white gap in SAT scores occurs
even in middle class suburbs, where whites and blacks are socioeconomically similar, and poverty is often an effect, as much as it
is a cause, of poor educational preparation. 15
We have argued that the government does much harm, and
little good, by maintaining racial and ethnic preferences, especially in higher education. Do we offer any different, or better,
suggestions for what the government should do?
The main thing the government should offer is strong and
effective public schools, primary and secondary; and public colleges and universities that have academic integrity. Racial preferences systematically erode the integrity of higher education, in
various ways which we have tried to indicate. The erosion of
higher education also has an ugly way of penetrating down (it
would "trickle down" if erosion could trickle) to the secondary
and even to the primary school levels. Grade inflation, lowered
("dumbed down") standards, bogus courses, racial and ethnic
cheerleading, intellectual nihilism, and cant about diversity are

15.

See, e.g.. ]OHI" U. 0GBU, BLACK AMERICAN STUDENTS IN AN AFFLUENT

SLBL1RB A STUDY OF ACADE~!C DISENGAGEMENT (2003).
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now common in high and middle schools, and even in grade
schools. They undermine the quality of public education, which
particularly disserves the children of poorer families- and hence
many children of minority families-who truly depend on the
public schools for a way up in life. A cynic might wonder
whether upper-middle-class advocates of racial preferences are
not promoting their own children's interests by seeking to
weaken public education at all levels, thus strengthening their
children's inherited advantage by weakening the potential competition from poorer children, who must rely on the public
schools for their preparation in life.
Apart from primary and secondary education, a child's
home life is surely the other important contributor, or noncontributor, to preparation for higher education. For young people to qualify for selective universities, it surely helps if they
grow up in stable, nurturing families, where children are read to,
where books are common household items, where homework is
supervised, where good grades are demanded, and where destructive peers and behavior are put off-limits. Government programs cannot readily guarantee these conditions, but to the extent that public policy can promote the relevant values, it ought
to do so-if the goal is that children of all races should have the
chance to realize their real academic potential.
Meantime, public universities and colleges should put an
end to racial and ethnic preferences. 16 They should eliminate bo16. As Carl Cohen sums up the dkcts of th<.: policy of racial and ethnic prdcrences
in higher education:
1. prekr<.:nce divides the society in which it is award<.:d;
2. it establishes a dreadful precedent in exwsing admiued racial discrimination
to achieve political objectives;
3. it corrupls the universities in which it is practic<.:d, sacrificing intellectual
values and creating pressures to discriminate by race in grading and graduation;
4. it breeds hypocrisy within schools and encourages a scofllaw attitude
among college officials;
5. it obscures lhe real social problem of why so many minority students arc nut
comp<.:titivc academically;
6. it obliges a choice of some few e1hnic groups, which arc to be favor<.:d over
all others;
7. it compels a de/ermination of how much blood is needed to establish race
m<.:mbcrship;
~.
it removes incen1i1·es for acad<.:mic cxcdkncc and encourages separatism
among racial and ethnic minoritics;
Y. it mismatches s/udems and inslillaions, greatly increasing the likelihood of
failure for many minority stud<.:nts;
10. it injures race relations over th<.: long haul.
CARL COHEN & )A~ES P. STERBA, AFFIR~ATIVE ACTIO~ A"D RACIAL PREFEREI'CE
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gus academic departments: those that substitute racial or ethnic
or political sloganeering for any serious pursuit of knowledge.
Most important, they should hold students (and faculty members) of whatever race or ethnicity to the same high standards,
rather than cultivating lower standards and lower expectations
for particular groups of people.
Ethnic and racial warfare have a~ain and again proved poisonous to societies around the world. 7 The best hope for a decent future is to seek and to promote people's common humanity rather than their superficial differences. That was the
"progressive" point of view at the inception of the modern civil
rights movement, and it still should be. American higher education ought to put the emphasis there, and not on the bankrupt
educational politics of racial and ethnic division.

17.

See SOWELL. supra note 12, at 177-90.

